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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
D.\RRELL J. DONOHUE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
l\1.~.\.RGARET ROLANDO, 
Defendant-Respondent 
RESPONDENT~s BRIEF 
Case No. 
10079 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff to recover for 
the wrongful death of his minor son resulting from 
a collision between an automobile driven by de-
fendant and 'a bicycle ridden by decedent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury, and from a ver-
dict and a judgment for defendant the plaintiff 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and 
and order granting plaintiff a new trial. 
1 
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S'TATEMENT OF FAC'TS 
The facts cited by Appellant are substantially 
correct. However since Respondent, Margaret Ro-
lando, was the only eye-witness to the accident, her 
testimony must be set forth in greater detail in 
this Brief in order that a complete picture of this 
accident be presented. 
Mrs. Rolando testified th1at she had resided in 
Spring Glen all 'her life and that she had traveled 
this road for almost seven years. She knew that 
children resided in the area of this accident (R. 
167). Mrs. Rolando then testified to the events 
leading up to the accident: 
"A. I got in my car land backed out of 
the driveway, and went down to the road and 
made the stop and went down to the road and 
when I got down by An·dy Yohan's place. I 
saw these children ·down on the side of the 
road fhat I was going down on. And I was 
going twenty miles an hour so I thought I 
better slow up 1a little bit, and I slowed up 
to fifteen miles an hour. Come to the little 
girl running down the road first. And, and 
I saw two other children on bicycles going 
straight down the road like I was. They were 
on the graveled part. And I passed the first 
child and the 8econd child was still going 
down the road. And pretty soon I heard this 
noise. Heard a clang. And I stepped on my 
bY.1ke and decided vvhatever was in front of 
n1e I might run over. I didn't see the boy 
here any more on the side of the road. So I 
went ac~·oss tl~e road n~1d st'"'pped. And turned 
2 
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around and looked back and the little boy was 
down on the road . . . " ( R. 168) 
Significant also is the distance between the two 
bicycles. In response to questioning from appellant's 
counsel, Mrs. Rol1ando testified as follows: 
"Q. O.K., now what if anything did you 
see after you passed the second person, the 
first person of the bicycle? 
"A. I still saw the little boy was still 
going down the road. That's what I saw. 
"Q. O.K., now how far ahea'd of him, 
how far ahead was he rather than the little-
girl on the bicycle? 
"A. He was about a car len,gth alhead of 
her. 
"Q. So that the little boy was only a car 
length between the little girl on the bicycle? 
Is that right? 
"A. That's how I saw it. 
"Q. W:as he on the paved portion of the 
highway? · 
"A. I didn't see him on the paved por--
tion. I saw him on the gravel." (R. 158) 
As Mrs. Rolando approached, the two bicycles 
were proceeding down the shoulder of the road ·ap-
proximately one-ear length apart. She passed the 
first bicycle :and observed the ~decedent still. going 
down the road on the shoulder. In the brief moment 
that followed, the boy turned in front of her auto-
mdbile. We thus see a perfectly normal roadwa~r 
situation without the threat of danger to anyone 
up to a point when the Rolando automobile was at 
3_ 
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most one-car length from the decedent's bicycle. 
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that 
decedent intended to do anything except continue 
to operate the bicycle along the shoulder of the road 
in the same direction that ·he h\ad been travelling. 
Mrs. Doreen Donohue testified that her son was 
in good 'health and had no mental or physical infirm-
ity (R. 18'9). That he was obedient (R. 190); that 
he knew he should not drive his bicycle on the road-
way ('R. 19'3); that he was intelli~gent (R. 194); had 
completed the First Grade, that he could read and 
write 1 ('R. ·191 ) . 
Appellant ·attacks the verdict and judgment of 
the ~court on two grounds: ( 1) That one of the 
Court's instructions relating to the standard of care 
of decedent was erroneous and (2) T·hat the Court 
failed to instruct the jury on the theory of last clear 
chance. 
The points raised by appellant 'are without 
merit as will be shown by the following argument. 
ARGUMEN'T 
POINT I. 
THE COURT'S INS'TRUCTIONS RELATING TO THE 
STANDARD ~oF ·CARE OF A CHILD WERE CO'RRECT 
AND NIO'T ERRONE'O'US. 
Appellant contends that the instruction of the 
lower ·court Number 7 was erroneous. In order to 
correctly analyze this instruction, it must be viewed 
in context. The Court gave two instructions relat-
ing to the standard of care of a child. These instruc-
tions :are: 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"INSTRUCTION #7 
The deceased, Phillip Donohue, ·had a duty to 
use that degree of care w·hich a reasonably 
prudent child of his age, understanding and 
intelligence as you find it would use: 
"1. To select a course of travel for his bi-
cycle reasonably free of the h'azard of getting 
into the course of a moving automobile on the 
highway; 
"2. To observe and become aware of the 
presence and movement of the Defendant's car 
upon the highway and avoid colliding with 
the same. 
"If you find by a fair preponderance of the 
evidence that the deceased violated his duty in 
one or more of the particulars above mention-
ed and that his doing so was the sole proxi-
mate cause of his being struck by the De-
fendant's automobile, or one of the contri-
buting proximate causes of his being so 
struck, then you must find 1a verdict in favor 
of the Defendant and against the Plaintiff, 
no cause of action." 
"INSTR'UICTION #8 
A child is not ·held to the same standard of 
conduct as an adult and is only required to 
exercise that degree of care which ordin1arily 
would be exercised by children of 'the same 
age, intelligence an·d experience. There is no 
precise age at which, as a matter of law, a 
child con1es to be held accountable for his ac-
tions by the same standard as applies to an 
adult. It is for you to determine whether the 
conduct of Phillip Dono!hue was or was not 
such as might reasonably have been expected 
from a child of the same age, intelligence and 
5 
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experience un·der the same or similar cir-
cumstances. If you determine that it was, then 
his conduct was not negligence. If you find 
that it was not, then his con,duct was negli-
gence. 
uif the Defendant in the driving of her auto-
mobile on the occasion in question observed 
that the deceased was a clhild of tender years, 
it then became her duty to exercise that de-
gree of care and observation that would avoid 
her colliding with the child unless Phillip 
Donohue did some act or acts which was the 
proximate cause of his being struck that the 
Defendant in the exercise of due care could 
not anticipate." 
Appellant argues first that the law of Utah is 
that whether the con,duct of 1a child constitutes negl· 
gence is a question of fact to be submitted to the 
jury. Appellant then argues that this issue is not 
submitted to the jury, but rather determined by the 
Court as a matter of law in its instructions. 
Respon·dent agrees that ordinarily the question 
of whether the conduct of a child is negligent is a 
question of flact to be determined by the jury, and 
contrary to Appellant's argument, this is precisely 
what the lower court did. 
In its Instruction No. 7, the lower court states 
that decedent had a duty to use that degree of care 
which a reasonably prudent child of his age, under-
standing and intelligence, 1as found by the jury, 
would use to ( 1) to select a course of travel free 
of 'hazard of getting into the course of a moving 
6 
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vehicle and (2) to become aware of the Respondent's 
vehicle and to avoid colliding with the same. 
First, it is clear that the jury was specifically 
instructed ( 1) that the duty on decedent was only 
that of a child of his age, understanding and intelli-
gence and (2) that su·ch capacity was only that as 
found by the jury. The jury under that Instruction 
could readily have· found that decedent was under 
no duty because a child of his age lacked the under-
standing and intelligence. The Court specifically 
prefaced its Instruction by stating that it was in-
cumbent upon the jury to first find that the decedent 
had the capacity to exercise the duty before the re-
mainder of the Instru·ction which set forth the dut)' 
had any effect upon their deliberations" 
We then turn to· the ·duty expressed by the 
Court in the Instruction. This Instruction simply 
states that decedent must use that degree of care 
which a reasonably prudent child of his age, under-
standing, and intelligence (as found by the jury) 
would use to select a course of travel reasonably free 
of hazard of getting into the course of a moving 
automobile on the highway. and to observe and be-
come aware of defendant's automobile an·d avoid 
colliding with the same. 
This instruction is :a correct statement of gen-
eral principles of law. Title 4'1-6-84 UCA 19'53 pro-
vides: 
"Every person riding a bicycle upon a road-
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
way shall be subject to the provisions of this 
act applicable to the driver of a vehicle except 
as to special regulations in this act and except 
as to those provisions of those acts by which 
their nature can have no application." 
Specifically our ~code provides in Title 4'1-6-87 
u~cA 1953 that: 
" (c) Wherever a usable path for bicycles 
has ·been provided adjacent to a roadway, bi·· 
cycle riders shall use such path and shall not 
use the roadway." 
When the Court in Part I of Instruction 7 
states that the bicycle rider should choose a course 
free of hazard, it is merely stating the foregoing 
statute in other words. 
In Part 2 of Instruction 7, the :Court is stating 
that every highway user must maintain a reason-
able and proper lookout for other vehicles lawfully 
using the highway. Instructions embodying general 
principles of law applicable to the issues are ap-
proved, 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error, Section 
810 and 8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles and Highway 
Traffic, Section 1018. 
Appellant also contends that the instruction im-
posed a duty to observe defendant's vehicle as it ap-
proached from the rear and states that this is error 
because this Court has held that there is no legal 
duty upon a highway traveler to observe vehicles 
ap'proaching from the rear. Appellant's contention 
overlooks the evidence in this case and misinterprets 
8 
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the holding in the case of Hayden v. Cederl~tnd, 1 
Utah 2d 171, 263 P. 2d 796. 
First of all, the evidence in this case shows 
that the decedent who ·had been proceeding down the 
shoulder of the road for some distance suddenly 
and without warning turned from the shoulder di-
rectly into the path o'f defendant's vehicle whic'h was 
proceeding on the traveled portion of the roadway. 
Title 41-6-69 UCA 1H53 provides in part: 
"(a) No person shall turn a vehicle at an 
intersection unless the vehicle is in proper 
position upon the roadway as required in Sec-
tion --11-6-66, or turn a ve'hicle to enter a pri-
vate road or driveway or otherwise turn a 
vehicle from a direct course or move right or 
left upon a roadway unless and until such 
movement can be made with reasonable 
safety . . ." 
Respondent would 'agree that while the bicycle 
was moving down the shoulder of the road there 
was no duty to maintain a lookout for vehicles ap-
proaching from the rear, but when decedent elected 
to change ·his course, then the statute quoted above 
applies. And implicit in that statute is the duty of 
a driver to maintain a reasona·ble and proper look-
out. 
In Hayden vs. Cederlund (supra), the Court 
did not hold that the driver had no duty to observe 
vehicles approaching from the rear, it held simply 
that under the facts of that case whether the driver 
9-
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had a duty to look to the rear was a question of 
fact for the jury. 
In the other case cited by appellant of Coving-
ton vs. C,arpenter, 4 Utah 2d 378, 2'94 P. 2d 788, 
this ·Court stated: 
"Unless contemplating a change of course, 
(Italics supplied), which ·appellant was not, 
or a reduction of speed, whic·h appellant was 
not, ordinary care does not usually require an 
appraisement of rear traffic." 
Clearly there is a legal duty on one contemplat-
ing 1a change of course to maintain a lookout for 
ve'hicles approaching from the rear which may be 
affected by such movement. 
We need only refer to Instruction No. 8 quoted 
above. This Instruction tells the jury that it is for _ 
them to decide whether the conduct of the ·decedent 
was negligent. The Instruction is a correct state-
ment of law. 
We need onl yrefer to Instruction No. 8 quoted 
above and compare th1at to an instruction quoted in 
the case of Mann v. Fairbourn, 12 Utah 2d '342, ;3'66 
P. 2d 603. In that case, the ·Court quoted the lower 
court's Instruction No. 6 which read: 
"A child is not held to the same s~andard of 
conduct as 1an adult and is only required to 
exercise that degree of care which ordinarily 
would be exercised by children of the same 
age, intelligence and experience. There is no 
precise age at which, as ·a matter of law, .a 
child comes to be held 'accountable for h1s 
10 
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actions by the same standard as applies to an 
adult. It is for you to determine whether the 
conduct of Robert Mann, Jr., was or was not 
such as might reasonalb'ly h1ave been expected 
from a child of the same alge, intelligence and 
experience under the same or similar cir-
cumstances. If you determine that it was, 
then his conduct was not negligence. If you 
find that it was not, then his conduct was 
negligence. 
"The rule just stated applies even when a 
child is charged with having violated a sta-
tute or an ordinance or the evidence shows 
such a violation. 'The question whether or not 
the child was negligent must still be 1answered 
by the above standard as I have stated it to 
you.'' 
Appellant in that case argue·d that the giving 
of that instruction was error. 'The Court held: 
'~e, however, prefer to answer plaintiff's 
contentions squarely upon the proposition that 
Court's instructions correctly reflect the law." 
It is at once apparent that the instruction- in 
the Fairbourn case (supra) is virtually identical 
with the instruction in this case. 
The lower court in this case correctly instructed 
the jury on this issue. The instruction is a correct 
statement of the law. 
Appellant f~rther argues that the lower court 
in its Instru·ction No. 7 imposed upon decedent a 
duty as a matter of law. ·on the contrary, consider-. 
ing Instruction No. 7 and No. 8 either sepa:rta.:tely 
11 
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or together, it is impossible to conceive how, by use 
of words, the ·Court could have more clearly sub-
mitted the issue of decedent's negligence to the jury. 
Were this a case where decedent was charged 
with the same duty as an adult, he would have been 
negligent as a matter of law. It became a question 
for the jury only because of his age. The jury under 
Instructions 7 and 8 were not compelled to find de-
cedent negligent in failing to observe a duty. They 
were at liberty to find th·at decedent did not possess 
that capacity. 'The Court specifically states that the 
duty imposed upon decedent was that duty com-
mensurlate with his age, understanding and intelli-
gence. The jury was at liberty under this instruc-
tion to find that decedent was not guilty of negli-
gence because he lacked the n·ecessary understanding 
and intelligence. 
Appellant cites the case of Saltas v. Affleck, 99 
Utah 281, 105 P.2d 176, in further support of its 
position, stating tha;t an instruction in th!at case 
was held to be error because the court instructed the 
jury that the defendant therein had the duty to 
drive so as to avoid colliding with anyone on the 
highway and concluding that Instruction 7 in this 
case is similar and therefore the same result should 
apply. Such is not the case. Instruction 7 in this 
oase only refers to the vehicle of defendant which 
was lawfully using the highway and not to all others 
using the highway. 
Applicable is a statement of Mr. Justice Mc-
12 
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Donough in his concurring opinion In the Saltras 
case, supra: 
"As to the third point discussed, while In-
struction No. 11 was, taken alone, erroneous, 
I am of the opinion that the instructions, read 
as a whole, could not have mislead the jury. 
Consequently, the giving o fsuch instruction 
was not reversible error." 
Respondent contends that Instruction No. 7 in 
this case correctly states the }aw and is clearly dis-
tinguishable from the instruction in the Saltas case, 
supra. Furthermore, the instructions consi1dered as 
whole could not possible have misled the jury. 
P01INT II. 
THE THEORY OF LAST C'LEAR C·HAN1CE AD-
\''ANCED BY APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY REJE1CT-
ED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Appellant asserts that 'the trial court erroneous-
ly failed to submit this case to the jury on the theory 
of last clear chance. 
N ecesarily involved in this question is an analy-
sis of the time and space relationship between the 
vehicle of defendant and the bicycle of decedent as 
they proceeded down the roadway. The evidence of 
this relationship must again be surveyed. 
Mrs. Rol1ando first observed the children from 
some distance as she approached from their rear 
( R. 154). She then decreased her speed from 20 to 
15 m.p.h. ( R. 155) and directed her vehicle toward 
the center of the roadway (R. 157). During ail this 
13 
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time, the three children were on the shoulder of the 
road off the paved portion. !They continued in this 
course and remained off the paved protion of the 
roadway on the shoulder as she approached to pass. 
She passed a little girl running behind the two bi-
cycles and passed the little girl on the bicycle follow-
ing decedent (R. 156-158). During all this time, 
there was no danger or imminent peril apparent be-
cause the. path o'f the vehicle and bicycle would 
never cross had decedent kept the same. course on 
the shoulder of the road that he hiad been follqwing 
for some considerable distance. 
At this point When Mrs. Rolan·do passed the 
bicycle following decedent, decedent was still pro-
ceeding down the shoulder of the p'aved portion (R. 
158). At that point, the vehicle of Mrs. Rolando 
was apprbximately one-car length 1away from de-
cedent (R. 158). Decedent then turned off the 
s'houlder an·d directly into the path of respondent's 
vehicle. 
A danger of imminent peril coulld only have 
been apparent at that mom·ent and it is only during 
this 'brief moment that the last clear chance theory 
could ope~ate and all reasonable minds must agree 
that lVIrs. Rolando could not possibly have h'ad any 
chance to have avoided the accident let alone a last 
cle~ar chance as demanded by the Rule. 
Appellant cites the C'ases of Morby vs. Rogers, 
122 Utah 540, 252 P. 2d 231 and Graham vs. John-
14 
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son, 109 Utah ;~~16, 166 P. 2d 230, in support of 
his contention that the theory should have been sub-
Dlitted to the jury. It is apparent in each of those 
cast\s that an analysis of the time-space rel)ationship 
shows that the motorist knew or should have known 
of the inattention of plaintiff and thereafter did 
not exercise his opportunity to avoid the accident. 
In J/ or by vs. Rogers (supra), there were facts 
in evidence which indicated that the decedent was 
riding a bicycle in the lane of travel of the motorist; 
and that the motorist had reason to know that de-
cedent was inattentive and was apprised of the 
danger of an accident at ~a point where his vehicle 
was at least 78 feet from the bicycle at a time when 
he could have taken steps to avoid the accident. 
In Graham vs. Johnson (supra), the defendant 
motorist was confronted with a child playing in the 
middle of the street w·ho was intent on playing a 
game and obviously inattentive to the approach of 
the Yehicle. Under the evidence, the jury could have 
found that the driver knew or should have known 
of the danger to plaintiff and that there was there-
after sufficient time for the motorist to warn the 
child of her approaeh. 
A consideration of the facts of the case at bar 
and applicable legal principles will show -that this 
case is clearly distinguishable from the two cases 
relied upon by appellant. 
Regarding the doctrine of "last clear chance", 
this Court has adopted as a law of this state the 
15 
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American Law Institute Restatement of Torts, Vol-
ume 2, Sections 4 79 and 480. Compton vs. Ogden 
Union Railway and Depot Company, 120 Utah 543, 
235 P. 2d 515. 
Section 4 79 of the restatement reads as fol-
lows: 
HA plaintiff who has negligently subjected 
himself to a risk of harm from the defendant's 
subsequent ne'gligence may recover for harm 
caused thereby if, immediately preceeding the 
·harm, (a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it 
by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and 
·care an·d (b) the defendant (i) knows of the 
plaintiff's situation and realizes the helpless 
peril involved therein; or ( ii) knows of the 
plaintiff's situation and has reason to realize 
the peril involved therein, or (iii) would have 
discovered plaintiff's situation and thus had 
reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless peril 
had he exercised the vigilance which it was 
his duty to the plaintiff to exercise, and (c) 
thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize 
with reasonable care and competence his then 
existing ability to avoid harming the plain-
tiff." 
Section 47·9 deals with a situation where a pl'ain-
tirf is in a position of inextricable peril. The facts 
of this case clearly show that the section can have 
no application. Until a moment before the collision, 
the decedent was travelling on the shoul'der of the 
road on a course parallel to that of the vehicle. Had 
decendent continued on the same course, the acci-
dent would not have happened. The paths of the two 
16 
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moving vehicles would never have crossed. Not until 
decedent for some reason turned his bicycle directly 
into the path of the Rolando vehicle was there a 
situation of peril. 
In the Compton case (supra), plaintiff who 
was walking adjacent and parallel to defendant's 
railroad tracks was killed by a slowly moving engine. 
The Court rejecte·d the "last clear chance" theory as 
'applicable to those facts and commented on Section 
4 79 above as follows: 
"We h·ave never held that a mere continuance 
of the same inattentive negligence created a 
situation of inextricable peril. When the in-
jured person's negligence 'has not come to rest 
as it had in the ·above cases so that by the ex-
ercise of reasonable care she would have been 
able to avoid peril at any time up to the 
moment of injury, the injury is then the re-
sult of the concurring negligence of the plain-
tiff and defendant.- T·he one was just as much 
the proxim!ate cause of the other." 
The Court commented further that even though 
decedent was walking in the same path that would 
be occupied by the engine, she could have at any 
time in the exercise of due care stepped to the silde 
and avoided the accident. A much stronger argu-
ment is apparent in this case. Decedent in this case 
\Yas until just a moment before the accident oc·cupy-
ing a position of safety. There was no peril im-
minent. Furthermore the duties imposed upon a 
defendant by Section 479 ·are absent in this case. 
17 
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There was no helpless peril for defendant to be 
apprise'd of and it was impossible for defendant to 
avoid the acci'dent. 
:The other facet of the Rule is s·et forth in Sec-
tion 480 which reads as follows: 
"A plaintiff who, by the exercise of reason-
able vigilance cou'ld have observed the danger 
created by the defendant's negli·gence in time 
to h·ave :avoided harm therefrom, may recover 
if, .but only if, the defendant (a) knew of 
the plaintiff's situation, and (b) real'ized or 
had re·ason to realize that the plaintiff was in-
attentive and therefore unlikely to discover 
his peril in time to a void the harm, and (c) 
thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize 
with reasonable care and competence ·his then 
existing ability to ·avoid harming the plain-
tiff." 
It is likewise clear and 'apparent that Section 
480 has no application to the facts of this case. Mrs. 
Rolando did not know that decedent would suddenly 
turn in front of her ve'hicle nor could she have re-
alized or had reason to realize that decedent was 
inattentive. There are no facts in the Recor'd that 
point to a contrary conclusion. 
Furthermore, ·there must ·exist a clear oppor-
tunity to avoid the accident. In this case, Mrs. Ro-
lando was at most one-car len'gth from the bicycle of 
decedent when it suddenly turned into her path. Be-
fore that moment, there was no peril or no danger 
or anyth.ing to put her on notice that the bicycle of 
decedent would turn. She was travelling at 15 m.p.h. 
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at that time which is approximately 23 feet per 
seronrl. The Rolando vehicle would have closed the 
cti~tance between the first bicycle and the one rid-
den by decedent in approximately 1 secon'd of time. 
It would be impossible for ~any person even the most 
extraordinary cautious and vigilant to have avoided 
this accident under those circumstances. 
A statement from Morby vs. Rogers, (supra) 
is pePtinent in this regard: 
"There is no doubt but th·at in order for the 
question to be propely submitted to a jury, the 
evidence must be such as would reason·aibly 
support a finding th1at there was a fair and 
clear opportunity in the exercise of reason-
able care, to avoid the injury. It would not be 
sufficient that it ap·pe'ar from hindsi'ght that 
by some possible safety measure, or even by 
reason'able care, the ~defendant by 'the skin 
of his teeth' could have avoided the collision .. " 
No evidence in this case would reasonably sup-
port the finding th·at Mrs. Rollan'do h'ad a clear op-
portunity to have avoided the collision. 
The lower court properly rejected the theory 
of ·'last clear chance". 
CON'CLUSION 
The facts of this case show that decedent sud-
denly without any prior warning turne:d his bicycle 
from a direct course on the shoulder of the road 
in front of the vehicle operated by Respondent, Mrs. 
Rolando. ''l' ere decedent charged with the standard 
of care 'applicable to an adult, he would have been 
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guilty of negligence as a matter of law and a direct-
ed verdict would have been proper. However, since 
the decedent was a child, ·his negligence or the lack 
of it becomes a jury question under settled Utah 
lraw. The lower court properly instructed the jury 
on his duty in this regard. The instructions cor .. 
rectly state the law ~and ,are not erroneous. 
The facts of this case also s·how that there was 
no inextrica1ble peril and no indication of in1atten-
tion on behalf of decedent. Mr~s. Rolando couldn't 
possibly be ch~arged with the ·duty of anticipating 
that a child on a bi~ycle who h·ad been travelling 
for some ·distance on the shoul~der of the road would 
suddenly without warning turn directly in front of 
her vehicle. Nor can it be s~aid that she had any op-
portunity to avoi;d the accident. ,She was at most 
one-car length behind the bicycle when it turned in 
'front of her. The lower court properly refused to 
instruct the jury on the theory of ''last clear chance.'' 
The verdict an'd judgment of the lower court 
muist be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Respondent 
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